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Abstract 
I 
As institutions of higher learning become all the more dependJnt upon pub-
1 ic financing throughout advanced industrial states, they are steadily being 
pulled into their central political-legal systems. Deci.sions bearifng on the 
form and.content of higher education have become the domain of state legisla-
tures, the federal bureaucracy and, lately, of the superior c.ourts .• 1
1 
This paper. 
attempts to provide a general explanation of how and why the judiciary 1 s ef- · 
forts to mediate disputes over controversial educational issues has
1 
led it to 
assume the role of policy-maker extraordinaire, with a special focus on devel-
opments in the German Federal Republic and the United States. The 1paper under-
takes a summary comparison of six cases related to questions of unirersity 
admissions, structures of university governance and. the selection of academic 
personnel, pointing to the tensions which exist between the "consti~utional 
rights 11 accorded to individuals, institutions and the state in matters edu-
cational. This work addresses the potential advantages and the inherent dis-
advantages ·that the 11 juridicalization11 of educational politics hold. for the 
11 separate-but equal" status of thajudicial branch itself. While the author 
is more concerned with highlighting the extent to which the German t:ourts 
have come to dominate the university reform process over the last ten years, 
she is also anxious to demonstrate that e. ducati.onal pol icy-makers 0\1 this side 
of the Atlantic are far from imrnmune to the perils of juridicalized politics. 
! 
I 
I 
! 
No amount of tampering with democratic theory_ can 
conceal the fact that a system in which the policy 
preferences of minorities prevail over majorities 
is at odds with the traditional criteria for distin-
guishing a democracy from other political systems. 
--Robert Dahl 
Was bleibet aber, stiften die Richter. 
--Wolfgang Perschel, 
misquoting HBlderlin• 
For at least a. decade, academic institutions have been under fire. But . 
unlike the phoenix, the principle of university autonomy,has not emerged un-
scathed from the ashes of what has been labeled a "revolution in the relation-
ship of law and social policy._'.' 1 As institutions of higher learning become 
a-11 the more dependent upon public financing throughout advanced industrial 
. . . 
states, they are steadily being pulled into their respective central political-
1 ega l sys terns. Decisions bearing on the form as we 11 as the on content of 
higher education have become the domain of state legislatures, the federal 
_bureaucracies and, lately, of the superior courts. The courts have tended to 
play a particularly active role regarding matters educational in their efforts 
to clarify -- or to obfuscate ""'.- the constitutional linkages between individ-
ual educational opportunities, institutional rights to self~determination and 
compelling state interests, where_ other actors have purportedly failed. In 
fact, as Hans N. Weiler has noted, 
it seems that, in both the American_ and the German 
case, the courts have a capacity for making·legis-
lative·i"nstitutions do things which they don't seem 
to be able to do on their own political ·momentum. 2 
Judicial elements have assumed ever greater responsibility for orches-
trating the revolution in social policy, for the justices are now functioning 
as law.:.makers in a dual sense. They are, in the first instance, obliged to 
render judgments as tothe constitutional acceptability of specific legislative 
2 
actions in the field of higher education~ In so doing, they inad~ertently 
I 
provide ever more concrete guidelines for fu_ture legislation. In 1
1
the act of 
, • - • • . - I 
becoming po 1 i t,ca 1 partisans, however, the cour·ts have a 1 so been fbrced to 
- . - ·- - I 
surrender a measure of their own institutional autonomy out on thei battlefield. 
This paper is an attempt to explore the expanding role of thel
1 
courts_ in -
relation to higher educational policy, with a particular focus on prends in 
the German Federal Republic and the United States. It begins with[a treatment 
of II creeping juridical i zati on 11 (al so 1 abe 1 ed II po 1 i ti ci zed legal i sm111 ), a process 
whereby policy-formulation and the statutory enactment of specific educational 
re.forms come to be r~garded ag a type of "constitutional_ trench wa~fare. 113 I 
- - . . . I 
attempt to provide a general explanation as to why and how the judicia.ry•·s ef-
1 
· forts to mediate disputes of a highly poiitical nature has led it to assume the 
role of policy-maker extraordinaire, especially in the Federal Repjblic. Next, 
I undertake· a summary comparison of six cases handed down by the Gdrman Con~ti-
tutional Court (B~ndesverfassungsgericht = BVerfG) and the ·us SuprJme Court -
- I 
(USSC), respectively, impinging on the concept- of university autono1my. Th~se 
cases are intended to illustrate the impact of judicial rulings on !procedures 
for university aclmissions, the structures of university governance ~nd the se-
lection of academic personn~1. ·Finally, I addre~s the potential ad~antages and 
the inh~rent disadvantages that the spread of p~l i ti.cized 1 ega 1 ism j15 1 i kely 
to entail for the formerly 11 separate but equal status 11 of the judic:ral branch_ 
itself. While the paper is more directly concerned with the criticfl role 
which the German courts,have carved ,out for themselves in the univetsityre-. ' - - - - -_ - I -
form process, _it also seeks to demonstrate that educational policy-iakers on 
this si,de of the Atlantic are far from immune to the perils of politicized 
• . . I' • 
_ legalism. 
A. COMPLEXITY, THE COURTS AND EDUCATIONAL CHANGE. I 
With varying degrees of optimism, social theorists as diverse Js 
I 
Mannheim, 
I 
I 
3 
Gershenkron and Ellul have tended in the direction of a 11 convergence theory 11 
which predicts the gradual progression of advanced industrial nations toward 
a common social structure, a common array of social values, political struc-, 
tures and technological developments. More recently, social scientists have 
begun to speculate that modern polities might also be heading in the direction 
of common educational patterns and shared models of educational change. 4 The 
proposition is a sensible one, given our growing foabi1ity to divorce educa-
tional policy-making from the political process as a whole,and given our pro-
clivity for borrowing back and forth information on institutional design and 
educational research. 5 
In a similar vein, the global character of uncertainties generated by the 
energy crisis, mounting inflation and rising unemployment figures has led a 
number of post-industrial bedfellows to share 11 an effective doubt about the 
appropriateness of existing institutions and about the assumptions on which 
they are predicated. 116 Checks and. balances don't seem to work as they used to, 
with the result that the very boundaries of politics appear to have shifted. 
Claus Offe; for instance, has observed a growing threat to the state's 11monop-
oly of politics 11 in traditional areas, a development that is as much a func-
tion of specialization and expertise, as it is an outgrowth of more complex 
relations among different segments of society. Add to that numerous citizens' 
demands to be more actively involved in all decisions directly affecting their 
lives. What might be Judged to be an_increasing 11 loss of state" (Entstaatlichung) 
in politics is nevertheless accompanied by an observable 11 politicization11 of 
other formerly autonomous or sacrosanct aspects of modern life, i.e. relations 
between parents, childr.en and teachers, or between professors and their uni-
·t· 7 vers, , es. 
Uncertain as to what is really pol i ti ca 1 and what is not these days, and 
no doubt somewhat frustrated that elected officials devote more time to rhetoric 
4 
I 
I 
I 
than to problem-solving, citizens are turning with increasing freq~ency to 
. . . . . I . 
that branch of go~ernment charged first and foremost with th~ prot~~tion of 
. . I 
- I 
individual (as opposed to group-political) rights. Due to an increasing spe-
ial i.zation of gove;nment functions, Western nations have witnessed\ a transfer 
·. of state power from the legislative to the executive branch; citizins begin to 
. - . . . - . I 
sense that they have been deprived of direct access to policy-make1s as a re-
sult. They may derive little comf~rt from the fact that relations\have been 
. . . . I . . 
far from harmonious between these two branches of government, in spite of an 
os~ensibl e convergence of many political and admi nist~ative functid~s. Legis-
1 ators and administrators alike, each branch questions the authorily of the: 
I 
other to make and execute decisions in a variety of issue areas. \hey seek an 
outside arbitrator. I 
.I 
The one arm of state power whose authority has -~ east been subJ\ect to 
question, whose members indeed continue to bask in an aura of relative infal-
libility, is the judicial branch. On.e partial. explanation for the rn~rmous 
respect still accorded the judiciary may rest. with the maxim: ignorance is 
I 
bliss. Until recently, citizens were not privy to information abouf how .the 
justices made their decisions or were simply so overwhelmed by the Fomplex 
. . . • . . . I . . . . 8 , I 
nature of 11 the law, 11 that they left it to the experts. Beyond this rather 
_· s.impl istic as.sessment, however, stands the belief that justices serle as the 
- . - -_ . I 
ultimate protector~ of legal procedure, the "watchdogs of due process" and 
·. I . 
equal protection. If for no other reason, this presumption.of final authority 
.-· . . . . . - . . . . . I 
permits judicial actors to lend a measure of legitimacy to almost e~ery social 
. . I 
. ' f 
policy they deign to approve. Even when compelled to rule on questions of 
• I 
. . . I 
political expediency, the courts' solutions are judged to be "less political" 
a_nd. 11more rational II than the compromises proffered by other gove~nmJnt offi-
: - - . . I 
cials. Interbranch rivalry has led to a further transfer of state authority 
from the executive to the judiciary, just as interbranch rivalry will no doubt 
5 
discredit the 11 apolitical 0 • character of .iudicial pronouncements in the long run. 9 
Politicized legalism (Verrechtlichung), as it is understood in Germany, 
is the process whereby "the constitution is repeatedly invoked and its prin-
ciples elaborated and interpreted in exhaustive detail. Such legalism channels 
recurrent conflicts among political or ideological factions in many institu-
tions.1110 .This ongoing invocation of constitutional principles has unleashed 
the Furies of Politicization and Legalization against the institutions of 
higher learning over the last ten years, especially in the Federal Republic. 
The pie-eminent nature of concerns about the relationship between higher edu-
cation and the law are perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the fifty-
first "synod" of the German legal profession, the Juristentag, made the jurid-
ical ization issue a key item on its 1976 agenda. 11 The serious allegation that 
the courts have taken certain liberties in establishing educational policy 
guidelines rests not only upon a growing number of symposia and an expanding 
body of literature on the topic, however. We have little difficulty in 
accruing evidence of a more "scientific''. nature with regard to this phenonmenon 
of "creeping" Verrechtlichung. Knut Nevermann,.for instance,·has contributed 
to the discussion of "evidence" by identifying four specific indicators of 
juridicalization in the educational arena. They include: 
a) the increase in the number of legal specifications 
through administrative rules and regulations; 
b) the increase in the number of court cases dealing 
with either the admissibility of certain policies 
or the legality of concrete decisions and develop-
ments in schools; 
c) the increased role of parliamentary legislation as 
a source of educational norms... · 
d) the growing use of legal arguments Lby individuals 
as well as by institutions --,jmmJ . in the 
political debate over educational policy.12 
While developments in the higher educational field may present us with 
a most striking case of juridicalization, it is also apparent to students of 
the policy process that the courts have in no way limited their attention to 
6 
ii 
litigation of an academic nature. No branch of law is immune, and no justice 
. I 
is spared the fate of a growing workload. FRG· statistics reveal ~hat the 
I 
number. of suits filed in the administrative COurts grew from 48,2,7 in 1970 
to 172,921 in 1978. Trials for those accused· of various "public dlisturbances 11 
(Ordnungswidrigkeiten, including demonstration arrests) rose from 
1
1
214,707 in 
• . I 
1971 to 658,463 in 1978. The finance courts saw their caseload~ increase from 
I 
13,525 suites in 1970 to 44,357 ·in 1978. 13 The number of case ent~ies per 
I 
. . . . . . . . . I ... 
justice brought before the Bundesverfassungsgeri cht _rose from· 154 ·r in .1976 to 
to 194.4 in 1978. 14 Judges in the US have not.fared all.that much betteri The 
. . . . 
number of cases filed with the US Supreme Court totaled 4,212 in 1Q70 and 4,731 
in 1978. 15 The Circuit Courts of Appeals disposed of 6,139 cases I (out of a 
total of 11,662 filed) in 1970 and 8,850 (out-of 18.918) in 1978.f6 The Dis-
' 
trict Courts commenced with 87;,300 civil. cases in_ 1970 and 138,800 I in 1978, 
while criminal cases on the docket numbered 38,100 in 1970 and 46,t00 in 1978. 17 
. I 
Given the phenomenal workloads facing ·the justices in traditional litiga-
. . r 
tional arenas·, what could possibly compel the courts to devote ~o much more 
. I 
I 
attention to questions of educational policy and academic affairs, jheretofore 
- - . . I 
the province of pedagogical experts and school boards only? It wotild appear 
that in both the US and the FRG, one's constitutional right to hig~er education 
I 
is largely a derivative one, and that the creatior1 of specific leg,1 norms for 
academe is equivalent to "legislating in the interstices of the la~," in the 
words of Christopher Wolfe. 18 Wolfe goes so far as to argue th.at ~he Consti-
- I 
·· tution has been taken out of Co11~Law, insofar as :the new ·contents w\ith which 
legal vacuums and loopholes have b~en filled~ h~ve given ~ise to a ~judicial 
. I 
necessary and proper clause." Guaranteed access to education, along with the 
I 
. I 
protection of academic freedom, are viewed by members of the bench as penum-
. I 
· bral to a catalogue of constitutional rights that have _turned into ~ndividual 
. .. . I 
1 iberti es: 19 free development of the per~onal ity (§ 2GG); equality '.rn 3GG) and "' 
I 
' 
7 
the free choice of profession (~ 12/lGG); fostered by the "social state" 
(i20GG); freedom of speech and association (Amd. I, USC), due.process and 
equal protection (Amd. XIV, USC). 20 But there are also.broader justifications 
being offered for·judicial involvement in academic matters, some of which go 
so far as to stress the state's "compelling interest" in a diversified stu~ 
dent body, in .compensating .for past patterns of- discrimination and in ensuring a 
highly trained, scientifically skilled labor force vital to the nation's eco-
nomic health and. military security. 21 Educational ch~nge, in short, is a key· 
to.social change; and educational policy, in the long run, can not be divorced 
from other socia1 policy problems. 22 
Clearly, the courts cannot be expected to find all of the answers. How-
ever, before addressing the manner in which German constitutional justices and 
their American .counterparts came to, saw and conquered many of .the otherwise 
irresolvable political conflicts facing educational authorities, we need to 
attend briefly to the question: under what circumstances, or conditions is the 
juridical solution likely to 11 stick? 11 
The judicial remedy is most effective when no other solution seems to 
exist! This is to say that any solution the court proposes is more lik~ly to 
be accepted and applied to a pressing social problem if the tribunal of justices 
need not defer to acts of parliamentary discretion, on the one hand, or where 
it is not subject to the prior constraints of its own decisions in some, oth_er 
, rel~ted case. 23 ,The Bu~desverfassungsgericht's 1972 Numerus clausus opinion 
discussed infra serves as one example; for want of an institutionalized set 
of university admissions and selection criteria, the justices had little trou-
ble pers_uading the Lander ministries to accept standards based on individual 
merit, waiting time and "hardship" status. 24 In this instance, one can rea-
sonably argue that the judiciary does not in.terpret, it in effect makes the 
law. 
8 
. . . I 
This tendency to create law (RechtsschBpfung) where none fonnfrly exists 
is more pronounced in the Federal Republic than in the US, for thelmain reason 
. . . I 
that the BVerfG justices are not ·at liberty to dispose of political questions 
' ' ! 
by·simply refusing to consider them. But even in such .cases wherelthe thrust 
of the court·opinion has been an exhortation to legislators-to invent their· 
. I 
I 
own solutions, ·the judiciary has met with little· success in decisively extri-
1 
. . I 
eating itself from the political process. In short, more legislation means 
more litigation, as disgruntled interest groups look to members of the bench 
· in Karlsruhe for a more favorable interpretation of the law _.;. or to the breth-
[ ren in Washington, D.C., for that matter.· 
I 
A judicial remedy will prove mtich less effective-when the courft as a body 
I 
finds itself politically or philosophically out of step with the· current law-
. I ·_ 
making majority. Given what we know about the socialization of judges, we may 
. . . . I 
presume that they are not habitually radical reformers, relatively jspeaking. 25 
Hence, the bench is less inclined to act'-- to·haveits 11 ultimate11 !authority 
! ·, 
questioned or jeopardized, as it were -- when it is unable to set the bounds 
1. 
for officials and state governm·ents; where it needs to defer to agency or par-
1 
I 
liamentary discretion (Gesetzesvorbehalt); if it is unable to resol:ve an issue 
I 
by a preventitive injunction; or where "it cannot render a dec·ision \that is 
. I 
otherwise easilymonitored. 26 ·The court will not openly challenge bolitical 
. I 
elements when its own autonomy might appear to swing in the balance!. In ref-
1 
I 
ere nee to the US Supreme Court, Robert Dah 1 has _detenni ned, · I 
I 
• except for short-1 ived transitional periods when thel old 
alliance is disintegrating and the new one is struggHng 
to take control of political -institutions, the Supreme 
Court is inevita_bly a part of the dominant alliance.j As 
a·n .element on the political· leadership of the dominant . 
alliance, the Court of course supports the major pol~cies 
of the alliance. By itself, the Court is almost owerless 
~to affect the course of national policy (my emp as1s1. 27 
The same can be said of the German Constitutional Court: Juridical zation is a 
,;covert" political activity, through .which the Court must necessari y seek to 
. I 
9 
enhance its own political status within .the leadership coalition. 
Perhaps the 1970's witnessed an end to such a period of disintegrating 
alliances, a thesis which would help us to explain why indeed the courts have 
been very powerful with respect to influencing policy in the educational sec-
tor. During the period under investigation, the justices in Karlsruhe had 
neither been appointed by, nor were they exactly partial to members of the new 
SPD government which assumed office at the end of the 1960 1 s. Nor does one 
find evidence of much political affinity between the members.of Warren court 
and the ,Nixon administration. In both instances, the philosophical orienta-
tion and composition of the two courts predated the new governments by at least 
a decade, a factor which (common sense tells us) must have enhanced the legiti-
· macy of the courts' pronouncements. By the late 1970's the equilibrium be-
tween the executive and the judiciary was reestablished, one can conceivably 
argue, given the SPD's rejection of its own more radical reform goals in the 
FRG and a number of revisions undertaken by the Burger Court as part of a 
larger political consensus in the us. 28 But even though the balance l)'laY have 
·since been restored at the leadE!rship level, one continues to observe in the 
aftermath that 11 ordinary 11 citizens turn with increasing frequency to the courts 
on a variety of important issues, in the United States as well as .in the Fed-
eral Republic. My grounds for generalizing about the process of juridicali-
zation in two societies characterized by very different legal traditions rest 
with a number of striking parallels that can be drawn between the Numerus 
clausus and Bakke cases, between the Group University and.Yeshiva decisions, 
and to a lesser extent, between the Radical Ordinance and the Keyishian cases, 
explored below (official citations i!l:f!:.~.). 29 
·B. INDIVIDUAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND STATE RIGHTS:. PREVAILING LEGAL TRADITIONS 
Before discussing case specifics, I think a brief comparison of the German 
and American legal traditions is in order. · Historically, the German system of 
' 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
i 
jurisprudence has been more concerned with adhering to the letter of the Basic 
I 
Law, -than with 'expounding upon its spirit. The judiciary's role hJs been an 
I 
inherently conservative one; it defines its main function as that df testing 
I 
. I 
current, legislatively mandated practices against the dictates of the provi-
. . . I 
I 
sional constitution. In recent years, however, the Justices have s
1
et out on 
! 
a course of greater activism, spurred on, - ironically, by that other strong-
. . I 
hold of German conservatism, the.CDU/CSu. 30 Prior to the 1972 Nume:rus clausus 
.. . . . - . . i 
decision, the 11 guardians 11- of Karlsruhe lion the whole declined the i\nvitation 
. . . . . i 
to define the content of open or opaque constitutional clauses1 further than 
. . . I 
·. ·· LwaiJnecessary to rule out the clearly un<:onstitutional. 1131 i 
. I 
I 
The Court's efforts to preserve ambiguity and, with that,: flex~bility. have 
. I 
nonetheless been limited by four features peculiar to·the German lehal system,, 
• . • I, 
the· so-called Rechtsstaat. 1) The BVerfG,: unlike the ·American! Suprbme Court, 
. I 
• . I . 
has· no doctrine of "political. questions" -at its disposal. As a resµlt, it is 
I 
required to pass judgment .on any i-ssue that is construed to fa] 1 wifhin close 
range of a coristitutiona·1 norm. In the absence of parliamentary se1f-restraint, 
- I 
• I 
or in view of a parliamentary failure to act, the Court is virtually compelled 
I 
to enter the:political arena. It is nonetheles~ a highly specializ~d court 
. I 
• I 
of constitutional affairs; administrative regulations, social security claims, 
. . . 1 . 
labor disputes, questions of civil and criminal justice or ffoanceiare re-
• '1 . 
vi ewe<i by other equally speci a 1 i zed court branches. 2) Elected by the two -
- . I . 
houses of Parliament for non-renewable twelve year terms, ·the membe~s of the 
I 
court are divided into two chambers~ call ed. Senates. In contr~st td the ad".' 
· ·cversary rule which governs case selection in the US, the Bundesverfdssungs-
i 
gericht bears responsibility for cases involving both individual 11 cdnstitu-
. I 
tional complaints" (the domain of the First Senate) and those ~nvol~ing the 
i 
. comprehensive 11 control of abstract legal norms 11 (delegated to the S~cond Senate). 
' i 
The clo_sest_ American equivalen_ t to "abstract control 11 is the principle of 
: I . 
I 
-
l 
11 
ju~icia1 review. In norm-control proceedings, however, initiators are not 
re4uired to have a direct, material, practical or substantial interest in the 
I 
I 
ca~e before them. In short, it is much easier for a political party, wearing 
thT cloak of a Bundestag caucus or (more frequently) a Land government of a 
I 
particular ideological complexion to turn a controversial political issue into 
a subject for judicial review. 3) Rather than extolling the virtues of l'prec-
: 
ed~nt, 11 the training of Gennan jurists emphasizes the precepts ,of Roman Law, 
viz. reliance on the deductability of the llone right answer" from a well-
el~borated system of legal norms. In fact, the dissenting opinion did not be-
coke part of the Court's legal.• apparatus until 1970, and the immediate 'result 
! 
wa~ that the justices found it impossible to close the lid, once they opened 
th
1
is Pandora's box to the political opponents of various rulings. 32 4) Finally, 
i . 
i~ light of the atrocities of the Nazi regime, the Constitutional Court is 
particularly sensitive to all questions pertaining to the German "Bill of -
Ri,ghts. 11 The Basic Law is responsible for the special tension which has devel-
oped between the guarantee of individual liberties, on the one hand, and the 
; 
' 
· otiligation of the 11 social state" to provide for the common good, on the other. 
I 
Ir, fact, individual constitutional _grievances are reported to account for about 
96 percent of all cases submitted and for 55 percent of all published opinions. 33 
T~e notion of 11 equal protection" -requires the state to take affirmative measures 
t? ensure both. As to this last point, the Court has realized that the costs 
of its orders to the state are likely to become prohibitive, as proved to be 
the case with the 1972 Numerus clausus decision. Yet the._Court can do no 
I 
34 other. 
The combined effect of the first three features .is· a high degree of 
irreversibility in the establishment of legal norms. The Constitutional Court 
o~erates along the lines of 11 what I have written, I have written. 11 On the 
o:ther hand, it is i,mpossible to assess the extent to which. this tendency also 
12 
I 
tempers i.ts decisions. The meliorating or aggravating circumstanqes produced 
I 
I 
-by the interjection of the fourth factor renders a decision more difficult, 
. - I 
i 
but does nothing to alleviate the Jnflexibility aspect of the judghlent process 
. . 1. 
generally. 35 
i 
The US Supreme Court has moved "from the byways onto the highways of 
I 
policymaking" under a different set of litigatidnal conditions. B~iefly, 1) 
- . . I 
adjudication is focused; rather than mulling over possible alternatives in 
I 
I 
search of the 11 one best way, 11 justices consider which ·11 remedies 11 ca:n be appro-
! 
priately applied to redress specific "wrongs"- done to identifiable I individuals 
i 
who possess 11 rights. 11 2) American adjudication is piecemeal in nature; while 
. I 
I 
precedents may be established, a courtroom victory often centers o~ statutory 
. I 
details or circumstantial factors. 3) In contrast to the practive of ab_stract 
norm control, Supreme Court judges must wait for litigants to;call They can 
not initiate adjudicative action, which consequently "makes ttle seJuence of 
I 
judicially ordered change dependent upon the capricious. timing ofJ i ti gants ,-" 
I 
rather than upon strategic planning by state agencies or Congr,essi9nal cau-
cuses.36 4) The unrepresentative character of the litigants who cdme calling 
.. I 
I • 
in Washington means that the judicial process does not provide established 
I I 
mechanisms for policy review, nor can the USSC justices adju.re members of Con-
. - , I 
· gress to take legislative action as forcefully as the BVerfG judgesr
1 
do under 
the principle of "statutory reserve 11 (Gesetzesvorbehal t). 37 A finajl differ-
ence between decisions rendered by the bench in Karlsruhe and :washi 1ngton lies 
I 
. in their overall legal-philosophical approaches to constitutio:nal r 11ights. • . I 
Whereas the German Court pushes a substantive-constitutional approa~h, equipped 
I 
as it is to render principles in the abstract and to delegate autho'rity for 
I. 
entire policy a_reas to specific organs of government·; the Supreme C9urt pre-
' 
sumes a -degree of special "procedural insight, 11 couching its argume~ts in terms 
I 
of due proce·ss and equal protection, th_at is, across:..the-board application of 
• ! 
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whatever rules are at hand. In the latter, the problem is to find the right 
rule rather than to establish the right social alternative. 38 
The 11 university crisis" of the late sixties neither recognized the exis-
tence of national political boundaries, nor respected the _limits of particular 
academic disciplines. Their 1itigationa1 and philosophical differences not-
withstanding, superior courts in th~ FRG and the US were forced to the center 
of the political stage to mediate conflicts produced by problems common to 
both. In a manner illustrative of convergence-theory-i:1.t-work, universities in 
both national settings fell prey to the pressures of: a) the rapid expansion 
of the student body, followed by dramatic increases am1:mg the ranks of the 
academic teaching staff;, b) the "knowledge explosion, 11 resulting from tech-
nological specialization and the exponential growth of science in society at 
1 arge; c) an emphasis on ega 1 i tari ani sm ,and the push for extended educa tiona 1 
opportunities; d) quantitative as well as qualitative changes in labor market 
demand; e) rising institutional and research costs and constraints imposed by 
finite fiscal resources; and f) conflicts generated by the politicization of 
academe. 39 I now turn to six cases which attest to the commonality of these 
pressures, in order to examine similarities and differences among the juridi-
cal outcomes produced by contrasting legal traditions. 
C. ADMISSIONS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: * Numerus clatisui and Bakke 
Article 12/1 of the Basic Law guarantees all Germans the right to choose 
freely their vocations, educational facilities and places of work, as do re-
spective articles in the L:inder constitutions. German institutions of .higher 
learning found it impossible to meet the constitutiona11ly-based demand, when 
. ' 
the Federal Education Ministry's enrollment projections of 280,000 for 1978 · 
and 560,000 for 1980 were ·surpassed in 1960 (291,000) and 1971 (587,000), 
* . . 
Cases are listed under Bundesverfassungsgericht; 1 BvL 32/70, 1 BvL 25/71, 
Urteil vqm 18. Juli 1972 and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
98 S. Ct 2733 (1978). 
I 
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respectively. 40 i 
I 
University rectors; in conjunction with LM.nder educational ministers, 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ! 
devised a system for imposing numerical limitations on admissions. I In 1972, 
I 
·.~dministrativ; courts in Ha~bu~g and Mu~fch lodged an ap~eal o~ beh~lf of sev-
1 
eral medical school applicants denied entry. In a··landmark decisiory of July 18, 
the Bundesverfassungsgeri cht found that the Numerus cl ausus syhem, I devised 
to meliorate tlie overcrowding of especially popular dis~ipline~, i.J. the 
- , . ' I 
medical- sciences, violated the precepts of Article 12/lGG.41 Its aJplication 
·- . . . , .I 
was permissible if and only if the university in question could prove that its 
. - , I 
, I 
departmental capacities were in fact completely exhau-sted, and until such time 
as_ 1 eg is 1 a tors s ucc~eded 1 n es tab 1 is hi ng specif i c, no.ndi sCri in; ~a tor~ admissions 
criteria or, alternatively, introduced a 11 lottery 11 system. The justices upheld 
' ' j 
the use of academic 11 achievement11 (Abitur scores and Gymnasium grade point av-
. I 
erages) as the primary detenninant, "waiting time" and 11 hardship sta'.tusll as 
'I. . . -· . . - , I - .. ! 
· secondary criteria. The Constitutional Court., in ess·ence, challenged federal 
' - ' ' ' : '' i 
· law-makers to develop "objective and universally _applicable norms 11 1or admis-
sions decisions, a prerogative th'at had been exercised so.lely by th~ university 
. . - . , , I 
in former times. As literally thousands of individuals continued td file 
I , 
I ' I 
claims against specific institutions, the superior administrative c9urts deemed 
it their role in subsequent decis.ions on "university capacitief to !expedite the 
flow of students by actually subjecting to systematic, external controls the 
. . I 
content of courses and the ·scope of acc1.demi c programs. 42 The Numeru:s cl ausus 
. system remained -in force.· i 
1· 
I 
In 1973 and again .in 1974, a white male named Allari Bakke was d
1
enied entry 
to the Medical School of the University of California at Davis, in s~pite of 
the fact that his grade .point ave'f'.'age, MCAT and "bench mark"- sc.ores. 1ere sig-
nificantly higher than a number of other individuals admitted to thej program. 
I 
, , • I 
.In·q case that reached the Supreme Court in 1977~ Bakke charged the Davis 
- ' '· I • 
I 
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Medical School with violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff 
argued that Davis' special selection program reserving a set number of admis-
sions sJots for minority applicants constituted reverse descrimination on the 
basis of race. In a decision characterized as "a remarkable act of judicial 
statecraft," the Supreme Court struck down the speci~ic admissions formula 
used at Davis, thus ordering Bakke's entry into the p,rogram,· while simultaneously 
' ' 
affirming the principle of special procedures for minorities to counterbalance 
the effects of past discrimination. Brennan's opinio~ for the majority re-
sorted to standards of "intermediate scrutiny," while dissenting Justice 
' . 
I 
Powen was the only one to adhere unfailingly to "equal protection" arguments. 
The overarching verdict nonetheless advanced the.noti~n that 11 the right tci pro-
cedural due process 11 has intrinsic as well as instrumental constitutional 
value, 11 and that.its value in this instance was absolute. 43 
The main difference between the Numerus clausus ~nd the Bakke rulings can 
. ' 
be summarized thus: the German Constitutional Court has sought to put pressure 
on as_ many parties as possible -- legislators, educat,ional administrative agen-
cies and individual institutions of higher learning -;- to ensure that univer-
sity places are made available to as many potential registrants as necessary.:i 
as soon as possible, in light of a clear-cut constitutional mandate. The US 
Supreme Court has applied pres-sure primarily to the i;nstitution fo question 
I 
to devise procedures ( for a 1 locating whatever places :exist) that ensure equal 
consi~~ration and protection to.individuals in their'.competition for those 
limited open slots. ~ search for parallels between the two cases r·eveals that 
in accepting 11 waiting time" and 11 hardship11 criteria,lthe German judiciary rec-
ognize~ the need to compensate for pas~ pattern~ of ~iscrimination, as does the 
American Court's attention to female and minority qualifications. In both 
cases, the justices realize there is a need for a societal commitment to the 
16 
I 
I 
I 
I 
principle of "equal opportunity," and they speak further of'the st~te's inter-
I 
I -
ests, as ranging fr6m special to substantial to compelling~ in thelinstitutions' 
ability to apply fair standards. 44- In neither case do the justiceJ go so far 
I 
. . I 
as to oblige the state to provide unlimited opportunities to individual appl i-
c~nts; but.while both courts begin their deliberations by focusing!
1
on equal 
opportunity,· the German case ends with admissions stipulations thai± are more or 
I 
less meritocratic in nature, while the American ruling ends with requirements 
I 
- of the procedura'r sort. 
I . 
Both cases have had the effect of "throwing the universities to the 
! 
. . - . I 
wolves;" they are damned if they do, damned if they don't. The judges admit 
I 
- I 
that "the freedom of a university to ma:ke its own judgments as to e
1
ducation 
. I 
includ~sthe selection of-its student body~-1145 Universities are nerertheless 
obliged to appear before the courts time and time again to defend their pro-
1 
cedures for estimating the numbers, as well as the mechanisms for diistributing 
- I • • I 
the slots.-· The most striking-aspect of the juridicalized treatment[ of admis-
• •. • • j 
sions questions is that it has lent itself to an institutionalization of do's 
. I 
. ' . . . i 
and don't's (e.g. the USSC's support for the "Harvard· model, the BVerfG's -· 
I 
three· selection criteria) for what were expected tobe temporary, e~ergency 
procedures.· 
I 
I 
! 
. ** D .. UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE:. The Group University and the Yeshiva Decisions 
Unable to implement directly their own strategy for higher edubational 
. I . 
. . •. I 
reform in the German Bundestag after 1969, conservative CDU/CSU elements 
! 
: joined forces outside parliament; their ,purpose was to block the_ "dtmocrat-
ici.zation" of :the university foreseen by the SPD's 1971 draft Fed_er11 Frame-
. I 
work Law for Higher Education (Hochschulrahmenoesetz). The SPD hoped to - - . - . . . - -. I 
** ·. . . - - . - I 
Cases are offici~lly listed as B~ndesverfassun~sgericht, 1 BvR 424A71, 
1 BvR 325/72, .verkundet am 29. Mai 1973 and National Labor Relations Board v. 
· Yeshiva Univers,ty, 100 S.Ct. 856 (1980). · ! 
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build on a parity model introduced earlier in Berlin, which provided for an-. 
equal number of faculty, student and non.,;academic staff representatives in 
university decision-making organs. On May 29, 1973, the Constitutional Court 
handed down a verdict-in favor of 398 professors and associates, who opposed 
the inclusion of the parity model in the Higher Educational "Preliminary Law 11 
(Vorschaltsgesetz) in Lower Saxony. The Karlsruhe majority ruled that three-
way parity in university decision-making organs violated the constitutional 
rights of the senior academic staff members, as posited by Art. 5/3GG (cited 
.inf.!:!). Moreover, the court held that these full professors were to be guar-
anteed at least one half of the seats (inassgebender Einfluss) in any body reg-
ulating teaching and examinations, and assured a clear majority (50 percent 
plus one, ausschlaggebender Einfluss) in matters of academic hiring, firing 
and research. (The decision took no note of the fact that tenured full pro-
fessors in most institutions were outnumbered at least two or three to one by 
associate and assistant level faculty charged with primary academic functions). 
In the final analysis, the Constitutional Court recognized in principle the 
need for the representation of all groups directly affected by academic de .... 
cisions in central university organs9 at the same time it limited proportion-
ately the amount of influence that each of these groups could brfog to bear on 
final decisions, according to the participants' level of "qualification." 
These proportional limitations were subsequently incorporated into the 1976 
Federal Framework Law. 
Judicial influence on university governance structures in the US does not 
find expression in a particular educational statute. According to the pro--
visions of the National Labor Relations Act, however, supervisors and mana'." 
gerial personnel are to be excluded from the categories of emp1oyees entitled 
to the benefits of collective bargaining. In 1974, the Yeshiva University 
Faculty Association petitioned the NLRB for certification as the union 
18 
bargaining agent for full time faculty at 10 of· Yeshiva '.s 13 graduate and 
II 
undergraduate schools. The university's central administration opposed this 
I 
action on the grounds that faculty members exercised supervisory ard manage-
• I, 
rial authority, and hence did not fall within the categories eligiple for 
bargaining status under the Act. 46 The NLRB ~ranted the petition,!and cer-
' I
tified .the faculty union after its successful election •. The university .re~ 
I 
. I 
fused to bargain with this unit .and the board refused to reconsider the "ex-• - . , I ; • 
I 
slusion 11 issue. On February .20, 1980, the Supreme Court affirmed ~n Appeals 
Court decision holding that faculty were "in effect, substantially 1i and per-
vasively operating the· enterprise" and they enjoyed a "managerial hatusll 
- . - • I 
sufficient to disqualify them from-the coverage of the Act. 47 .. Le}t unre-
. ! 
solved was question of. their ".supervisory status;" while latter ty~e implies 
. . . . I 
that academic professionals use independent judgment, overseeing a1 institution 
in the interest .of the employer, the.former status designation indlcates a 
more general, cooperative involvement of faculty in 11 developing,an4 enforc-
ing employer policy. 1148 The dispute appears to have been narrowlyldefined in 
. . . \ 
i 
terms of the particular degree of "alignment with management" obse~ved to exist 
between the Yeshiva Faculty and the Central Administration. 
I 
In concentrating on the 11 managerial -status"aspect, - the Supretrie Court· 
' ! 
carefully skirted· the issue of statutory interpretation, viz. the rieed to 
! 
adapt the National Labor Relation:Act's broad provisions to differ~nt types of 
• ' I 
workplaces. This _act of judicial restraint, in conjunction wi.th Yeshiva's 
I . 
standing as a private university., produced no clearcut-rule with r~spect to 
professional academics and collective bargaining rights. While Yeslhiva find-
I 
i ngs are expected· to lend themse 1 ves to a -case by case review, the 
1
effect of 
- the Group·Univers'ity decision was immediate and universal. 
The Group University case focuses on a constitutional _grievanc
1
e involving 
I 
full professors' rights to self-determination vis a vis other insti
1
tutional 
i 
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groups in matters of teaching and research; the Yeshiva suit was technically 
appellate in nature, entailing no specific constitutional complaint (_although 
the latter might be construed to cover the freedom of ·association). On the 
surface, the two cases demonstrate no significant overlaps with respect to 
substance: In fact, a debate over the collective bargaining rights of German 
professors is unlikely ever to arise, since :they are legally designated public 
servants, whose employment and salary terms are regulated by Federal and State 
Civil Service Codes. But the two' rulings do raise similar questions of prin-
ciple. In both instances, there is a recognition that ·facult~ responsibilities 
and functions are distinct from trose of other segments of the university com-
' . 
munity, a distinction which rests 1 with the level of professional qualification. 
Both courts have implicitly recognized the institution's right to :provide for, 
indeed to require, faculty involvement in university governance, insofar as 
"professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation and implementation 
of academic policy. 1149 
A critical question addressed in both cases is whether the faculty's right 
to participate is equivalent to· the faculty 1 s right to decide. The German and 
' 
American Courts approached this question from very dirferent angles, as did 
the respective litigants. To protect themselves from challenges "from be-
low," the German professors filing suit iri 1973 tried to claim for themselves 
the same measure of discretion and absolute authority over academic decisions, 
j 
that the Yeshiva faculty argued they did not have, in order to ensure bargain-
ing power vis a vis administrators 11 from above." The Supreme Court begins with 
the assumption that faculty "authority in academic matters is absolute; 1150 the 
' Constitutional Court concludes with the idea that the faculty must have final 
say in certain areas,· but its power is 11 substantial 11 a~d 11 c6ntrolling, 11.not 
absolute. The German judiciary finds a "middle solution/' to which it attaches 
a numerical formula that becomes: legally binding on all institutions of higher 
20 
learning. · For the present, the American judiciary holds a more "extreme" posi-
1 
tion· wMch ·lends itself to application in institutions whose circumstances 
. II 
will have to resemble· closely those·at Yeshiva. ·1 
I 
'! *** E. ACADEMIC FREEDOM: The Radical Ordlnance and the Keyishian Rulilngs 
The German experience underHitler led the authors of .the Basile Law to; 
incorporate academic freedom into the catalogue of fundamental rigHts in 1949. 
Article 5/3GG asserts, 
Art and Science, research and teaching shall be 
free. Freedom of teaching shall not absolve from 
loyalty to the Constitution. · 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
Neverthe 1 ess, on February 18, 1972, Chance 11 or Wi 11 i Brandt joined [the heads 
of ·the L~nder governments in formulating guidelines to regulate thel public em-
. . I 
ployment of right and left wing radicals (Extremistenbeschluss). This "Radical 
. . . . I . . 
Ordi.nance 11 was intended to subject civil service candidates of ques
1
1
tionable po-
. litical backgro~nd to "constitutional loyalti' ~hecks, p~ior to gra~ting them 
tenure. Academics were included in li.ght of. their civil service cl~ssification. 
i 
Instead of checking personal political histories only in those case~ where 
i 
11 evidence11 was already known to ~xist, the exception quickly became! the rule. 
·. . . . . . ' ! . . 
.After 1973, Land-1 evel "constitutional protection offices, 11 tied to a monolithic, 
computerized appar~tus at the national level, .carried out .routine ihvestigations 
. . . I 
on persons applying for public service jobs, as well as on those up!for tenure. 51 
. . . . . . . . I 
On May 22, 1975, the justices in Karlsruhe announced that even; those work-
. . . . I . . 
ing for the state on a temporary or trial basis had to submit to a test of 
. I 
their loyalty 
• ~ - . I 
(including legal a.nd medical interns). The BVerfG decreed: 
. . • I • 
The political· loyalty obligation requires more than just 
a formally correct,· but otherwise disinterested, cool, 
internally-distant posture toward the state and the I 
--- ··1 
·'• 
! 
*** I These cases are officially cited as Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 ~vL 13/73, 
vom 22. Mai 1975. and Ke ishian v. Board of Reents of the Universit of the 
State of New York, 385 U.S. 589 1967. I 
) 
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Constitution; it demands of the civil servant in 
particular that he clearly distance himself from 
groups and endeavors which attack, oppose and 
defame this state, its constitutionally created 
organs and the valid constitutional order. (my 
emphasis). 52 
With this particular verdict, the Constitutional Court has gone far to forge 
new ties between the exercise of one's duties and prerogatives within the aca-
demic community and the exercise of professional 11 voice 11 and choice.of career 
outside the university. Instead of reading into· Art. 5/3 a set of double 
safeguards for the individual with respect to academic freedom and free ,politi-
cal expression, the court has reinterpreted Art. 5/3 in favor of the state's 
"compelling interest11 in its own survival and good name. This variation on 
the "guarantee" theme means that the proverbially neutral civil servant is to 
be replaced with a prospective public servant who not only evinces a willing-
ness to support the principles of the Constitution; s/he must demonstrate 
further an ability "to defend actively" and unquestionably the state itself 
against its real and potential enemies. In fact, individuals have been barred 
from public service {Berufsverbot) not because of "unconstitutional" .behavior 
(verfassungswidrig), but on the grounds that their political statements and 
affiliations have been "inimical to the constitution" (verfassungsfeindl ich), 
an argument which in many cases has stood in violation of Art. 21/2 (free choice 
of political parties) and Art. 33 (free and equal access to civil service em-
ployment). The judiciary has provided no concrete standard for distinguishing 
between academic discourse on alternative political ideologies, personally cool 
and distant expressions regarding the existing German state., or an active call 
to political insurrection. 
Free speech and academic freedom were dominant constitutional concerns in 
the American case of an English instructor, Keyishian, and three of his col-
leagues; the fpur refused to sign a certificate declaring they were non-com-
. . 
munists when their original employer, the privately owned University of Buffalo 
22 
merged in 1962 with the State University of New York system. The $UNY Board 
I 
of Regents sought to draw up a··list of llsubversi-ve 11 organizations for the ex-
. ' 
pr~ssed purpose· of using membership in such organizations as prima 11 facie evi-
' 
dence for disqualifying or dismissing individuals. from service in the state's 
'1 
public schools. Disqualification would ensue on the basis of membership in-
I . I - . 
quiries addressed by the appointing authority to an applicant's fotjmer em-
- . I 
players or associates, according to a 1939 law. Keyishian 1 s one-year-term 
I, 
contract was not renewed on the bas.is of his refusal to sign the cJmmunist 
disavowal certificate. I 
i, 
The Supreme Court did not question the Board 1s legttimate interest in 
I . 
protecting the educational system from subversion, but it reject~d \the dis-·_ 
qualification mechanisms which it warned were 11 susceptible of sweeJ
1
-ing and 
improper ·application," si~ce they lacked 11 terms susceptible of obje[ctive 
. I 
measurement. i, 53 The Court declared portions of New ·York 1 s Educatio 1n Law and 
its Civil Se~vice Law unconstitutional, b·ut did. not limit itself to\ a ~ejec- · 
' I 
tion of inappropriately vague statutory provisions. The judiciary ~ent a step 
. - . . - . I . 
further _in linking safeguards of academic freedom to a defense of the larger-
. . . . . I 
socfo-political 11market place of ideas. 1154 Moreover, the justice~·~ppeared 
-. I . 
sensitive to an individual's and their own inability to draw fine irnes be-
. I 
tween academic discourse and subversive expression: ! 
The teacher cannot know the extent-, if any; to which\ 
a "seditious" utterance must transcend mere statement 
about abstract doctrine, the extent to which it niust f 
.be intended.to and tend to indoctrinate or incite t6 
action in furtherance of the defined doctrine~ 55 [ · 
• I . 
In an earlier related decision, Wieman v. Updegraff (involving a lo~alty oath 
at the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College in 1952), the cdurt had 
similarl.y held that "membership" alone could not disqualify from putjlic edu-
catfonal appointment .. Tne ."free speech 11 dimension of academic appoi[ntment 
was substantiated further when Justice Frankfurter, concurring in th1
1
e -1957 
I 
I, 
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decision of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, refused to stand the individual's guar-
antee of political expression on its head: 
For society's good - if understanding be an essential 
need of society - inquiries into these problems, spec-
ulations about them, stimulation in others of reflec-
tion upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible. 
Political power must abstain from intrusion into this 
activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise 
government and the people's well-being, except for 
reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling. 56 
Herein lies the critical differences between the German and. American judi-
cial responses to the concept of academic freedom. Whereas the freedom of 
teaching and research is explicitly designated as an individual right in the 
Basic Law (listed fifth in the11 Bill of Rights" section), academic freedom, 
in fact, takes a back seat to the state's presumedly "compelling interest" in 
an actively loyal corps of civil servants.· While the· defense of academic free-
dom in the US Constitution appears to be of a more penumbral character, the 
individual's rights definitely take precedence over those of the state in 
questions of political loyalty and expression. 
The Radical Ordinance and Keyishian suits have at least two items in com-
. man (buried ,n the fine print of the opinions). The first is the unwillingness 
on the part of both the Constitutional and the Supreme Courts to accept member-
ship in a "subversive" organization as a necessary and sufficient condition for 
disqualification from professional public servic.e. The second point in common 
is that both cases involve, but do not directly address, an institutional right 
to the determination of university personnel. It is rather obvious that uni-
versity hiring, firing and promotion rights are ultimately connected with the 
protection and pursuit of research and teaching objectives, "since institutional 
success in these areas depends substantially on the personal capacities of in-
dividual faculty members. 1157 Government regulations meant to induce academic 
institutions to alter otherwise nondiscriminatory hiring practices infringe 
24 
upon the university's and its members• rights to freedom of association, at 
. i 
the same time. they interfere with scholarship. 
F. COMMON THEMES, UNCOMMON POTENTIAL FOR INFLUENCE 
What tentative conclusions· can be drawn about judicial influen<i:e in the 
. . i 
field of higher education, with respect·to the Federal Republic and
1
1the United 
i 
States? I-begin by pointing out that the operational definitions of scholar-
. I 
ship iterated by judges in Karlsruhe a.nd in Washington do not subst~ntially 
I 
differ~ The German definition, which the BVerfG borrowed from Humboldt in 
. i 
its 1973 opinion, charges academics to consider Wissenschaft 11 as so~ething 
I 
sti 11 not coinpl etely found and to treat it as never completely to bJ discovered 
I 
and yet persistently to be pursued. 1158 The American v~rsion assert~ that 
I 
I 
scholarship merits constitutional protection because. 11 no field of education·. 
I 
1 
is so thoroughly comprehended by man (sic) that new discoveries canrtot yet be 
! 
made.~ 59 i 
I 
I 
Academic freedom, a composite of indiv.idual and institutional +ghts, 
I 
becomes the core issue in all of the cases reviewed here. Supreme Court Justice 
. - . I . 
Frankfurter outlined the 11 four essential freedoms of the university') in his con-
I 
curring Sweezy opinion: 1) the right of the institution to set· its 1
1
own .aca-
. I 
demi c standards. for faculty selection; 2) the right to determine what will be 
I 
taught; 3) the 
cide who may be 
. ' 
right to determine how it will be taught; .4) the right to de-
1 
adini tted to study. 60 In each of these four areas,· -ihe German 
• ! 
institutions of higher learning are subject to many more limitationi
1 
as a 
direct result of judicial involvement than is true for the United States. Yet . . I 
I 
· in all of the cases discussed supra, there persists a tension betwe1n the 
. . I 
rights of the individual, those of ·the institution and the interests; of the 
state in matters educational. In an effort to clarify which s·et of irights 
. seem to prevail in each case, I have devised a classificatory scheme of sorts, 
I which I hope to develop at a later date: 
I 
I 
• I 
Cons ti tu ti ona 1 
Principles 
Broadly 
defined 
Narrowly 
defined 
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Prevailing Set of Rights 
INDIVIDUAL---) INSTITUTIONAL---) STATE RIGHTS 
RIGHTS RIGHTS · ( "COMPELLING INTEREST") 
Sweezy 
Keyishian 
Numerus Clausus 
(1972, 1977) 
Group 
(Group · University 
University) 
Bakke Yeshiva 
Radical Ordinance 
(Bakke) 
Individual rights find their basis of strength in the constitutional .9.QE!_-
ments themselves. I would like. to suggest that they are therefore open to 
broader interpretation. Institutional rights are the product of tradition; 
owing to a lack of documentary evidence as to their constitutional status, I 
would expect the judiciary to be more cautious, viz. narrow, in the protection 
. . 
. : . . 
it directly affords the universities. The power of the state is grounded in 
-
its constitutionally mandated responsibility to protect its citizens• rights 
and liberties; its powers are limited through enumeration, its powers expanqed 
by the growing fiscal dependency of educational institutions. I suspect that 
the broad definition of state's rights depends on the possible consequences of 
individually exercised freedoms. 
For the present, I will simply note that the question of institutional 
rights has ostensibly received the least amount of attention from the courts. 
But to the extent that both the tenure processes and participation in univer-
sity governance can be contrued as devices for protecting and promoting in-
dividual academic freedom, one cannot ign~re the institutional context in 
which they operate. Public institutions of higher learning may be compelled 
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to stand up for their rights vis a vis the state legislatures as t~ey struggle 
I 
to secure their financial futures. To say that the superior courts ~ave not 
I 
- I 
acted on the matter of institutional rights in the past does not p1eclude them 
. i 
from doing so a few years down the road. In conclusion, what impa¢t has this 
I 
litigational foray into the field of higher education had on the jJdicial in-
1. 
stitutions themselves? 
G. AUTHORITY GAINED, AUTONOMY LOST. I 
I 
The courts have paid a heavy price for their involvement in the policy-
- i 
making process. Critics in the Federal Republic have· gone so far as to label 
! 
the judiciary in a disparaging fashion 11 a secret superministry of education. 1161 
- .• • • I 
. ! 
I 
The judictary 1 s attempt to forge a workable political consensus where none 
_- - - - - - - - - I 
' - •• • ' I 
exists is inextricably rooted in the status quo. Laws build upon laws. To 
, - - - - - - I 
the extent that the courts cannot or will not excuse themselves inJresponse 
to questions of political expediency, they ·are able to engrave th-e1r own higher 
educational prescriptions on legislative tablets. The ,irony is thJt even if 
I 
. . I . 
conflicting social groups are able to smash those tablets in a fitjof anger, 
. I 
they are inevitably forced to return for a new set. I 
I 
Wi,thin limits, the contribution of the German and American courts to the 
- I 
policy process in their respective systems-is a function of thefr Jbility to 
I 
go beyond the established i1legal 11, criteria rooted in statute, precJdent and 
I 
I 
constitution -- which is what usually _occurs when justices attempt 1
1
to rule on 
. . . - I . 
the basis of "legislative intent. 11 The tools they employ may _be strictly 
- -- - - ·: - - . - I 
. - - - - .- - - I 
11 1 ega l II ones, but the setting of any case brought to the courts fol- the pur-
poses of relegating social conflict is undeniably ~politi~~l. 11 As 
1
Robert 
Dahl argues, I I 
. f 
/I/f the Court were assumed to be a 11 political 11 in-: 
stitution, no particular problems would arise,, for ijt _ 
would be taken for granted"that members of the Court 
-would resolve questions of fact and value by intro-] 
ducing assumptions derived from their own predispo- i 
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sitions or those of influential clientels and consit-
uents. But since much of the legitimacy of the Court's 
decisions rests upon the fiction that it is not a po-
litical institution but exclusively a legal one, to 
accept the Court as a political institution would 
solve one set of problems at the price of creating 
another. 62 
One problem does lead to another, as demonstrated by the effects of the 
BVerfG Numerus clausus and "capacity" verdicts in particular. Moreover, the 
tendency toward a more open "politicization of justice" in Germany, with its 
parallels in the US, has caused a few cracks in the twin fac;ades of judicial 
infallibility and unquestionable authority: 
it is worth considering whether overindulgence in 
appeals to the Bundesverfassungsqericht to make 
fundamentally political decisions in favour of one 
or the other policy is not bound to reduce respect 
for it as a soufce of resolution of disputes which 
is endowed with a higher rationality and authority 
than the political actors possess. 63 
Conflicting values (and personality differences) within the courts dispel the 
notion that the judicious treatment of 11 law 11 will always provide a single, 
authorit~tive, 11 right11 answer; otherwise there would be little need for the 
instrument of the dissenting opinion in Germany, and less need for an array of 
concurring and dissenting opinions in the US in the wake of very close votes. 
It is the purpose of law to promote a just social order within the frame-
work of basic rights. In other words, law has a dual function, that of pre-
serving order and that of protecting citizens against potential abuses of 
state power. It is dangerous to stress one at the expense of the other. 'This 
duality also makes certain contradictions inevitable, since Western constitu-
tions are markedly deficient in concrete criteria for establishirig at what 
point individual well-being must defer to the common good, under what circum-
stances soci.al order takes precedence over civil liberty (at the crux of the 
Berufsverbot issue)-~ not that we would want to expect them to be so explicit. 
The advent of politicized legalism produces other tensions and snags in 
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the fiber of societies whi.ch. characterize themselves as democratic!. Many of 
I 
the changes thrust upon the higher educational systems, in _particuJ ar, stem 
! • 
from a demand for greaterllsocial accountability and responsibility." The 
I 
institutions of higher learning have been called upon to respect tte constitu-
tiona·1 rights of individuals in determining who may or may nqt ent+r them. 
! 
Democratic systems have accepted the premise that education is a c1vn right, 
whether it has beerf explicitly stated (Art. 12/1 GG) or implicitly I contained 
(First· and Fourteenth Amendments, USC) in their respective constit4tions. ·. 
i 
The courts are therefore cons ti tu ti anally ob] iged to prot~ct ~he rights 
i 
of individuals and minorities against the collectivity or the majoJity, and 
! 
. . . I 
individual rights have often been· secured at the expense of qualit.}( education 
. . . . .· I 
and freedom for the whole. It may be a plus for-·democratic system~ that citi-
zens have learned to make more effective use of the mechanisms of government 
I 
I 
.available to them for the protection of their rights. But it cert1inly com~ 
plicates .our understanding of conventional forms of participation i)n the policy-
1 
making.process. I. 
I 
. I . 
Juridicalization is here to. stay, certainly in the Federal Rep
1
ublic and 
I 
probably in the United States. Despite the somewhat different thru'.sts of judi-
. I 
- cial involvement in educational policy (a 11 litigational 11 approach i'.ri the latter, 
! 
in contrast to a llconstitution.al" orientation i-n the former), the c~urts in 
' 
both countries have shown that they do have an importantjpositive rple to 
- , ' \ 
I 
play, in my judgment.· Given the highly complex ·nature of societal rnteractions, 
. I 
the tasks of the judiciary now come to include the clarific_ation an~ specifi-
1 
cation of the duties, rights and responsibilities that various elem~nts of the 
. I 
academic task environment have with respect to each other and in re1ation to 
i 
society as a whole. I hold this· development to be an acceptable onf only ,to 
the extent that all societal institutions are guaranteed "equal protection 
I 
before·the law." In light of my own political values, I am opposed;to the 
. I 
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process of politicized legalism if it means that some institutions have only 
duties (universities)., some have responsibilities (welfare agencies) and others 
have only ipso facto rights (corporations). 
I fear, however, that the disadvantages of juridicalization may far out-
weigh the advantages in dealing with political - constitutional conflicts. The 
contradiction between society 1 s need to respond flexibly to constantly changing 
socio-economic conditions and the generally irreversible nature of judicial 
pronouncements. is an 11 antagonistic11 one. The carved-in-stone character of 
Constitutional Court verdicts, especially, assuages the uncertainties of deci-
sion-makers engaged in one social conflict, at the same time it generates new 
ones. Even if US Supreme Court justices do not exhibit quite the same pre-
dilection for irreversible decisions-as their German counterparts, they are 
far from enthusiastic about overturning prior rulings should the opportunity 
arise. Policy-makers, on the other hand, may not be entirely satisfied with 
the resu1ts of litigation, yet they are nonetheless glad to be relieved -of 
many a difficult political decision in this manner. A bad compromise is often 
better than no compromise at all for politicians and administrators whose at-
tentions must quickly be diverted to other pressing social problems. 
While legal judgments ensure conflicting ·parties· a degree of consensus 
(contrived though it may be) in the short run, they impair the universities• 
ability to manage their own interdependencies more creatively in the fong run. 
Each court ruling presents university administrators, legislators and bureau-
crats with a clear outline of constraints, but blocks off categories of alter-
natives which might be utilized later on to handle institutional contingencies. 
Justices are by definition legal experts. Their lick of substantive expertise 
promises to become a serious impediment in developing their capacity for pro-
posing remedies that are as educationally effective as they are legally ra-
tional. 64 ·The~ filS judicia, upon whose counsel· citizens•· and institutions 1 
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fu_tures no\a_/ more heavily depend, occasJonally bears a rather suspilious family 
rese111blance to the Wizard of Oz. i 
Naturally some supreme courts are more likely to speak~ cath 1edra regard-
! 
· ing educational matters than are. others. I am- arguing that the jur
1
idicaliza-
tion of academic reform issues is a functio·n of a lack of political! consensus, 
! 
, and that educational systems in other Weste_rn nations may be able tp rely on 
I 
alternative vehicles for conflict resolution. The approaches basedi.on consti-
i 
tutional rights in the United States and the Federal Republic are t~e product 
of very diverse leg~l traditions; the .tendency of the courts-to invblve them-
. . I 
I 
selves in specific. educational conflicts at all levels of schoolingi evinces a 
I 
growing number of parallels.nonetheless. (Lately the judicial branches in- the 
. I 
US and the FRG have fielded questions. of sex education and- have ever seen fit 
I 
to define the concept of a 11 disab.led learner,'' entitling children tp- partici-
pate in state compensatory programs). The juridicalization of univrrsity re-
, 
form in the Gennan Federal Republic may be special insofar as it is\ among the 
first system to have been so thoroughly infused with formal legaL values. It 
' ! 
will certainly not be the last. I 
I 
Jesse Choper has set forth four proposals delegating and delim~ting: the 
~uri sdi ctiona l powers of the US Supreme Court, which in effect would[ 1 ead to 
I . 
greater specialization in constitutional matters along German 1ines~_63 He 
I 
emphasizes .. that 
the federal judiciary's ability to persuade the. 
populac~ and public leader~·that it is.right and 
they are wrong is determined by-the number and 
frequency of its attempts to do so, the felt im-
portance of the policies it disapproves, and the 
perceived substantive correctness of its deci-
. sions. 65 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Theodore Lowi•pursues a similar argument, maintaining that "juridical 
I 
· democracy" should be used to reimpose the basic "separation of powers" 
I 
31 
doctrine by putting a halt to the delegation of discretionary powers from the 
legislature to the administrative agencies of the Positive State. 66 
I agree with the basic prognosis that the persuasive powers of the judi-
cial branch are finite and that the justices must be very careful not to ex-
haust their 11 capital II which derives from the 11 po1 itica11y neutral II character 
of their pronouncements in earlier times. I am much less optimistic, however, 
about the judiciary's prospects for.extracting itself from the complex web 
of intergovernmental relations which it has helped to spin, and which in turn · 
precludes its ability to reestablish the separation of powers among legislative, 
political and administrative actors. It is indeed the responsibility of the 
federa'l judiciary to monitor the perfonnance of the other branches. As the 
. . . . 
scope of state activity expands, the courts witness an increase in the number 
and range of social institutions which fall under their purview, including 
universities. Along with David Horowitz, I can offer a caveat, but no way out 
of the juridicalization dilemma: 
Over the long run, augmenting judicial capacity 
may erode the distinctive contribution the courts 
, make to the social order. The danger ·;s- that 
courts. i"n developing a capacity- to improve- on the 
work of other- i nsti tuti ons, may become a 1 together 
too much like them. 67 
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